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Lessons from a tragedy
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This is as it should be. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that a human tragedy is at the core of Verita’s 300-page document and that no matter how comprehensive the organisation’s investigation and its list of recommendations, they will be incapable of reversing events which led to an untimely end of a wife, mother and dedicated health professional.
Nevertheless, there are clearly very serious lessons to be learned from Verita’s findings. Notably, the seemingly elementary idea that thorough checks must be carried out to make absolutely certain that medical staff are qualified to undertake work that they are allotted must be grasped and acted upon.
There also appears to be great scope for the creation of an entirely new culture at the hospital. The lack of communication detected by the investigatory team must be addressed. So, too, must the unacceptable ‘blame culture’, the existence of which was also identified.
At a more technical level, there is work to be done in the fields of training, the codification of procedures and the maintenance of records.
Few Islanders will read the main Verita report or its addendum featuring additional criticisms. In spite of this, media coverage of their content will easily convey the message that all is far from well at the General Hospital and that its managers and their political masters are faced with a series of challenging tasks if matters are to be put right.
This will undoubtedly come as a shock to many people. We are accustomed to believing that our hospital services are of the very highest order and that the care to be expected at the General Hospital is in every way superior to that offered by the UK’s National Health system. That there has been complacency and a falling away of standards in too many areas is deeply disturbing.
Meanwhile, if there is any room for comfort in Verita’s findings it concerns the role of consultant John Day, who, in the view of the investigatory team, has been criticised unfairly. Mr Day, no doubt, will be relieved and pleased that his long – and as far as the taxpayer is concerned, expensive – period of suspension should now come rapidly to an end.
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